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Abstract 
Safety cases are gaining acceptance as assurance vehicles for safety-related systems. A safety case documents the 
evidence and argument that a system is safe to operate; however, logical fallacies in the underlying argument may 
undermine a system’s safety claims. Removing these fallacies is essential to reduce the risk of safety-related system 
failure. We present a taxonomy of common fallacies in safety arguments that is intended to assist safety 
professionals in avoiding and detecting fallacious reasoning in the arguments they develop and review. The 
taxonomy derives from a survey of general argument fallacies and a separate survey of fallacies in real-world safety 
arguments. Our taxonomy is specific to safety argumentation, and it is targeted at professionals who work with 
safety arguments but may lack formal training in logic or argumentation. We discuss the rationale for the selection 
and categorization of fallacies in the taxonomy. In addition to its applications to the development and review of 
safety cases, our taxonomy could also support the analysis of system failures and promote the development of more 
robust safety case patterns. 
Introduction 
Safety cases have evolved as a valuable approach to structuring the argument that a safety-critical system is 
acceptably safe to operate, and they have been developed in several application domains (ref. 1). The failure of a 
safety-critical system indicates that the risk of operating the system might be higher than previously thought. In the 
most general sense, a failure is either the result of an event that was anticipated but which was predicted to have a 
probability of occurrence below some critical threshold, or it was the result of an unanticipated event. If an 
unanticipated event occurred, then there must have been a defect in the safety case since the total risk exposure for 
operation of the system would have been based entirely on the random occurrences of anticipated events. 
Our prior analyses of accidents involving safety-critical systems, including a minimum safe altitude warning 
(MSAW) system whose failure contributed to a major commercial aviation accident, suggested that system safety 
arguments sometimes invoke incomplete or inherently faulty reasoning (ref. 2). These fallacies, if undetected, could 
lead to overconfidence in a system and the false belief that the system’s design has obviated or will tolerate certain 
faults. That a safety case might contain a flaw is to be expected, but it is important to bring attention to the problem 
and to remove defects to the extent possible. 
In this paper, we discuss a very specific source of possible defects in safety cases, namely flawed arguments. Our 
informal review of the safety cases built for a set of important safety-critical applications showed that flawed 
arguments were present in each case. Based upon our observations and a survey of known logical fallacies, we 
developed a taxonomy of fallacious inferences in system safety arguments. 
Fallacies in System Safety Arguments 
From our prior analyses of failed systems (ref. 2) we hypothesized that logical fallacies are prevalent in system 
safety arguments. To test this hypothesis, we sampled publicly available industrial safety arguments and then 
analyzed each argument in our sample for fallacies. To obtain our sample, we conducted a survey of publicly 
available safety arguments, which yielded eight safety arguments in the disciplines of air traffic management, 
automotive engineering, commuter rail transit, electrical engineering, nuclear engineering, and radioactive waste 
storage (ref. 3). Of these, we selected three safety arguments for inclusion in our sample: the EUROCONTROL 
(EUR) Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums (RVSM) Pre-Implementation Safety Case, the Opalinus Clay 
geological waste repository safety case, and the EUR Whole Airspace Air Traffic Management (ATM) System 
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Safety Case. The organization of these three arguments made them amenable to analysis by individuals who did not 
possess expert knowledge of the relevant application domains. The EUR RVSM and whole airspace safety cases are 
preliminary and do not necessarily reflect final engineering standards; however it is still appropriate to examine the 
arguments for fallacies so that those fallacies can be addressed prior to implementation. 
Two of the authors read and independently evaluated each of the three safety cases selected for the study. The 
purpose of this evaluation was two-fold: (1) to determine whether fallacies appear in these safety arguments with 
significant frequency; and (2) to identify the types of fallacies committed. Both of the reviewers had at least a basic 
understanding of fallacious reasoning from classical philosophical literature and drew from that knowledge in 
performing their evaluations. When a reviewer came across what he believed to be faulty reasoning in an argument, 
he highlighted the relevant section and recorded a brief note explaining why the reasoning was problematic. Upon 
completing their evaluations, the reviewers compiled their results into a comprehensive set of fallacies for each of 
the safety cases and then achieved a consensus as to which of the comments they made were indicative of fallacious 
reasoning in the arguments. The following sections summarize those results for each safety case using fallacy 
descriptions taken from Damer (ref. 4). Note that the goal of this study was to examine the form of the safety 
argument, not to evaluate the safety of the associated systems. 
EUR RVSM: The EUR Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums (RVSM) Pre-Implementation Safety Case concerns 
a proposed reduction in the minimum amount of vertical distance that must be present between any two aircraft 
operating in EUR airspace. RVSM would accommodate a greater density of air traffic and would thus enable EUR 
to meet an expected increase in demand for air travel over the next several years. The RVSM safety case is 
organized as a natural language document but provides a graphical version of the safety argument in Goal 
Structuring Notation (GSN) in an appendix (ref. 5). To make the study tractable, we limited our evaluation to the 
GSN portion of the safety case, which spanned nine pages. 
Table 1 summarizes the fallacies the reviewers identified in the EUR RVSM safety case with one column for each 
reviewer. Relevance fallacies were the most prevalent in the argument and accounted for two-thirds of the fallacies 
identified. 
Table 1 — Tally of fallacies identified in the EUR RVSM safety case 
Fallacy Reviewer A Reviewer B Total1 
Using the Wrong Reasons 5 15 16 
Drawing the Wrong Conclusion 3  3 
Red Herring 1  1 
Fallacious Use of Language 2 2 4 
Hasty Inductive Generalization 4  4 
Omission of Key Evidence  1 1 
Total 15 18 29 
Although the purpose of employing two reviewers in the case study was to assemble a more complete set of fallacies 
and not to examine the consistency between reviewers, the disparity between the results of each reviewer is 
significant. Differences are present both in the quantities and types of fallacies that each reviewer identified, the 
most notable of which concerns the fallacy using the wrong reasons. All but one of the instances of this fallacy 
concerned an inference that the argument invoked repeatedly. Reviewer A flagged only the first few of these 
instances before choosing to ignore them while reviewer B flagged them all. Moreover, both reviewers identified 
two instances of fallacious use of language due to ambiguity in the argument; however, the specific instances they 
identified did not overlap, suggesting that they had trouble agreeing upon which language was ambiguous or 
misleading. Finally, reviewer A identified a greater variety of fallacies than did reviewer B, which may be due to 
A’s more extensive background and experience with logic and argumentation. 
                                                          
1 Instances of a fallacy that were detected by both reviewers are only reflected once in the totals. 
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A recurring problem in the RVSM safety case was its use of evidence that did not support the immediate claim the 
argument was attempting to make. As an example, Figure 1 presents a portion of the argument concerning the role 
of flight training in the RVSM safety requirements. Of the four premises supporting the claim that “there is 
sufficient direct evidence of [flight crew] training design validity,” (St.2.3.1) only one—G.2.3.1.4—pertains to the 
claim. The other premises state that various aspects of the training program have been specified, but this information 
does not aid the reader in determining whether the training design is valid. 
Opalinus Clay: The Opalinus Clay safety case concerns the feasibility of constructing a long-term radioactive waste 
storage facility within the Opalinus Clay—a geological formation in the Zürcher Weinland of Switzerland. The 
argument claims that the Clay is sufficiently stable to enable the facility to meet its safety requirements for at least 
the next ten million years (ref. 6). The safety case spans 22 pages and is written in bulleted natural language with 
major safety claims enumerated as subsections accompanied by their corresponding arguments. It includes a variety 
of arguments for the feasibility and safety of the facility, including “...multiple arguments for safety that: 
• Demonstrate safety and compliance with regulatory protection objectives; 
• Use indicators of safety that are complementary to those of dose and risk and that show that radionuclide 
releases and concentrations due to the repository are well below those due to natural radionuclides in the 
environment; 
• Indicate that the actual performance of the disposal system will, in reality, be more favorable than that evaluated 
in quantitative analyses; and 
• No issues have been identified that have the potential to compromise safety” (ref. 6). 
Both reviewers agreed that the Opalinus Clay safety case was the most compelling of the three arguments they 
reviewed. Indeed, reviewer B did not identify any fallacies in the argument while reviewer A identified only three, 
one of which was later determined to be valid reasoning. Table 2 shows the fallacies identified by reviewer A. 
Figure 1 — Excerpt from the EUR RVSM safety case 
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Table 2 – Tally of fallacies identified in the Opalinus Clay safety case 
Fallacy Reviewer A Reviewer B Total1 
Arguing from Ignorance 12  0 
Omission of Key Evidence 2  2 
Total 3 0 2 
One of the arguments in the safety case discusses uncertainty in the characteristics of the chosen disposal system. It 
states that the choice of uncertainty scenarios to consider “remains a matter of expert judgment” and then describes 
the process in which scenarios were developed and considered using a panel of experts. A criticism of this approach 
would be that scenarios suggested by some experts were not selected for consideration but should have been. To 
avoid this criticism, the argument should mention some of the scenarios that were suggested but excluded from 
consideration by the panel along with its rationale for doing so. Elsewhere, the argument claims that “uncertainties 
[in the risk assessment cases] are treated using a pessimistic or conservative approach,” but no evidence is provided 
to support the claim of conservatism. Finally, in considering possible human intrusions, the argument assumes that 
“...possible future human actions that may affect the repository are constrained to those that are possible with 
present-day technology or moderate developments thereof” (ref. 6). Although it is difficult to imagine how one 
would avoid making this assumption, it is possible that unforeseen future innovations will render the analysis moot. 
EUR Whole Airspace: The EUR Whole Airspace Air Traffic Management (ATM) System Safety Case preliminary 
study was conducted to evaluate “the possibility of developing a whole airspace ATM System Safety Case for 
airspace belonging to EUROCONTROL member states” (ref. 7). The study proposes arguments for preserving the 
current safety level of EUR airspace under a unified air traffic organization instead of the patchwork of 
organizations that comprise EUR today. We are aware that the arguments presented in the EUR safety case are 
preliminary; nevertheless, we think it is appropriate to examine them because operational arguments will likely be 
derived from them. Like the RVSM safety case, the report presents mostly natural language arguments but does 
make use of GSN in some places. Again, we chose to limit our review to the major GSN elements of the report, 
which spanned two pages. These included two separate arguments for the safety of the whole airspace: one based on 
arguing over individual geographic areas and one based on reasoning about the whole airspace ATM rules. Both 
arguments shared the same top-level goal that “the airspace is safe.” 
Table 3 contains the results of the reviewers’ evaluations of the EUR Whole Airspace argument, which reflect the 
combined fallacies in both the argument over geographic regions and the argument for the safe implementation of 
whole airspace rules. 
Table 3 – Tally of fallacies identified in the EUR Whole Airspace safety case 
Fallacy Reviewer A Reviewer B Total1 
Red Herring 4  4 
Fallacious Use of Language 2 6 6 
Fallacy of Composition 2 2 2 
Omission of Key Evidence 2  2 
Total 10 8 14 
Neither argument considered possible interactions between geographic areas, such as when an aircraft is handed off 
by one air traffic controller to another in an adjacent region. Even if the safety rules are respected within each region, 
without special considerations for interactions between regions and with external airspace, the rules might be 
violated in the context of the broader whole airspace system. Both reviewers flagged these arguments as instances of 
fallacious composition. 
                                                          
2 The reviewers later agreed that the reasoning labeled as arguing from ignorance was not fallacious. 
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A Taxonomy of Safety-Argument Fallacies 
All three of the case studies we reviewed exhibited common types of faulty reasoning, supporting our hypothesis 
that logical fallacies are prevalent in safety arguments. To facilitate detection of these fallacies, we developed a 
taxonomy of safety-argument fallacies based upon existing taxonomies described in the philosophical literature that 
we adapted according to our observations from the survey. Our specific objectives in developing the taxonomy 
were: 
1. To cover a broad range of fallacies but only those that are relevant to safety argumentation; 
2. To categorize the taxonomy so that a user may determine the set of fallacies that might pertain to a given 
argument without learning the entire set of fallacies in the taxonomy; 
3. To define the fallacies so that they are accessible to safety professionals who have not received formal training 
in logic or argumentation; and 
4. To design the taxonomy for extensibility. 
Coverage: Several taxonomies of fallacies in general arguments exist; we surveyed those of Damer, Curtis, Dowden, 
Pirie, and Govier to develop our taxonomy of safety-argument fallacies (refs. 4, 8-11). These taxonomies place no 
restrictions on the types of arguments they consider, and so they include emotional appeals, malicious fallacies that 
convey acts of willful deception, and formal, syllogistic, and causal fallacies. We assumed that safety arguments do 
not contain emotional appeals for their acceptance or willful attempts at deception. Formal and syllogistic fallacies, 
which occur in deductive arguments, are unlikely to appear in safety arguments because purely deductive arguments 
may be expressed formally and verified mechanically. Likewise, safety arguments rarely attempt to establish causal 
relationships between events (with the exception of inferring a causal relationship between correlated events), and so 
causal fallacies are improbable. Based on these assumptions, we excluded these fallacies from our taxonomy. Table 
4 summarizes the fallacies we excluded, and Table 5 provides examples of fallacies we excluded. 
Table 4 – Excluded fallacies grouped by source 
Category Damer Curtis Dowden Pirie Govier 
Fallacies Defined by Source 60 65 107 75 32 
Emotional Appeals -7 -3 -9 -4 -2 
Malicious Fallacies -9 -8 -15 -11 -4 
Formal & Syllogistic Fallacies -7 -19 -8 -11 -3 
Causal Fallacies -4 -1 -3 -1 -3 
Other Excluded Fallacies -7 -11 -32 -16 -3 
Collapsed Fallacies -8 -3 -12 -9 -2 
Fallacies Represented 18 20 28 23 15 
Table 5 – Examples of excluded fallacies 
Category Examples 
Emotional Appeals • Argument from Outrage 
• Misleading Accent 
• Scare Tactic 
• Style Over Substance 
Malicious Fallacies • Appeal to Force 
• Ad Hominem 
• Poisoning the Well 
• Straw Man 
Formal & Syllogistic Fallacies • Affirming the Consequent • Four-Term Fallacy 
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• Denying the Antecedent • Undistributed Middle Term 
Causal Fallacies • Post Hoc ergo Propter Hoc • Reversing Causation 
Other Excluded Fallacies • Drawing the Wrong Conclusion 
• Complex Question 
• Fallacy of the Continuum 
• Hasty Inductive Generalization 
• Refuting the Example 
• Regression 
• Scope Fallacy 
• Special Pleading 
• Tu quoue 
• Wishful Thinking 
After excluding emotional, malicious, formal, syllogistic, and causal fallacies, two of the authors assessed the 
remaining fallacies individually and excluded those that were unlikely to appear in safety arguments for various 
reasons. These fallacies appear in the “Other Excluded Fallacies” category in Table 4, and examples appear in Table 
5. For example, wishful thinking was excluded because it concerns arguments in which a claim is asserted to be true 
on the basis of a personal desire or vested interest in it being true. Such an argument is very unlikely to appear 
explicitly in a safety argument. Hasty inductive generalization, which occurs when an argument offers too little 
evidence in support of its claim, was excluded because its broad definition encompasses most of the other fallacies. 
Other fallacies such as refuting the example were omitted because they pertain to refutations, which seldom appear 
in safety cases. Finally, fallacies whose definitions differed only subtly from each other were collapsed into a single 
fallacy; these appear in the row marked “Collapsed Fallacies.” 
There was a strong degree of overlap in the fallacies that remained from each of the five taxonomies we surveyed. 
We consolidated these fallacies into a final set of 33 fallacies, which is presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 – The safety-argument fallacy taxonomy 
Circular Reasoning 
Circular Argument 
Circular Definition 
Diversionary Arguments 
Irrelevant Premise 
Verbose Argument 
Fallacious Appeals 
Appeal to Common Practice 
Appeal to Improper/Anonymous Authority 
Appeal to Money 
Appeal to Novelty 
Association Fallacy 
Genetic Fallacy 
Mathematical Fallacies 
Faith in Probability 
Gambler’s Fallacy 
Insufficient Sample Size 
Pseudo-Precision 
Unrepresentative Sample 
Unsupported Assertions 
Arguing from Ignorance 
Unjustified Comparison 
Unjustified Distinction 
Anecdotal Arguments 
Correlation Implies Causation 
Damning the Alternatives 
Destroying the Exception 
Destroying the Rule 
False Dichotomy 
Omission of Key Evidence 
Omission of Key Evidence 
Fallacious Composition 
Fallacious Division 
Ignoring Available Counter-Evidence 
Oversimplification 
Linguistic Fallacies 
Ambiguity 
Equivocation 
Suppressed Quantification 
Vacuous Explanation 
Vagueness 
Omission of key evidence appears in the taxonomy both category and as an entry because there are many special 
forms of this fallacy. Fallacious composition occurs when an argument attempts to infer the properties of a system 
from those of its components without considering interactions between the components that might violate those 
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properties, and fallacious division occurs when an argument attempts the converse. An argument ignores available 
counter-evidence when it makes a claim for which there exists refuting evidence but fails to address that evidence. 
Oversimplification describes arguments that cite evidence obtained from models of system behavior but fail to show 
that the models correspond to the system in question. 
Categorization: We initially categorized the fallacies in our taxonomy according to Damer’s categories of relevance, 
acceptability, and sufficiency. Relevance fallacies concern the use of premises that have no bearing on the truth of 
the claims they ostensibly support, acceptability fallacies concern the use of inherently faulty inferences, and 
sufficiency fallacies describe ways in which arguments can fail to provide enough evidence in support of their 
claims. Damer’s topology exhibited three problems that contradicted our goals of making the taxonomy accessible, 
however. First, the categories did not correspond to the types of arguments one might encounter in a safety case, and 
so they provided little help in determining the set of fallacies that might pertain to a given argument. Second, the 
categories required a user of the taxonomy to know a priori the type of fallacy committed, which does not aid users 
who apply the taxonomy in order to determine whether an argument is fallacious. Third, the domain of safety 
argumentation presented special challenges in assigning the fallacies to these categories unequivocally. Many of the 
fallacies Damer classified as relevance or acceptability fallacies, such as fallacious composition and division, could 
be remedied by supplying additional evidence, suggesting that in some cases they would be better-classified as 
sufficiency fallacies. We also considered the topologies employed by the other taxonomies we surveyed, but they 
suffered similar limitations. 
Since we were unable to find a suitable topology to adapt to our taxonomy, we developed our own by inferring 
relationships among the fallacies with respect to the types of arguments they address. Our topology—shown in 
Table 6—groups fallacies into eight categories, which are summarized below: 
• Circular reasoning occurs when an argument is structured so that it reasserts its claim as a premise or defines a 
key term in a way that makes its claim trivially true. 
• Diversionary arguments contain excessive amounts of irrelevant material that could distract a reader from a 
weakly supported claim. 
• Fallacious appeals invoke irrelevant authorities, concepts, or comparisons as evidence. 
• Mathematical fallacies describe common pitfalls in probabilistic and statistical inferences. 
• Unsupported assertions are claims stated without evidence. 
• Anecdotal arguments show that their claims hold in some circumstances but fail to generalize their validity. 
• Omission of key evidence occurs when an otherwise complete argument omits evidence that is necessary to 
establish its validity. 
• Linguistic fallacies concern the use of misleading language that might lead the reader to an unwarranted 
conclusion. These fallacies may appear in any informal argument. 
A user of the taxonomy may compare the argument he is reviewing to each of the categories in the taxonomy to 
assess the argument’s validity. For example, the user might first examine the structure of the argument for circularity 
and then evaluate the relevance of its premises. A verbose argument might contain diversionary premises, and 
appeals to regulatory standards, practices, conventions, or authorities such as regulatory agencies should be checked 
to ensure that they are relevant to the context of the argument. If the argument relies upon statistical evidence, then 
the user should examine the conclusions that it draws from that evidence for mathematical fallacies. Unsupported 
assertions and anecdotal evidence may suggest circumstances in which the argument’s claims do not hold. If the 
argument follows an accepted pattern of reasoning, the user should verify that it has properly instantiated the pattern 
and not omitted evidence. Finally, the user must be wary of vague or ambiguous terms in the argument because 
different parts of the argument might interpret these terms differently and lead the user to an unwarranted conclusion. 
Organizing the fallacies by the types of arguments in which they appear instead of the manner in which they 
undermine arguments addresses the shortcomings we identified with Damer’s topology. For a given argument, a 
user may assess the argument with respect to the categories that describe it and then determine the set of fallacies 
that might pertain to the argument. Thus, users must only be familiar with the categories in the taxonomy and not the 
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entire set of fallacies in order to apply the taxonomy, and they are not required to know a priori that an argument is 
fallacious. This organization also improves the orthogonality of the topology because the type of argument in which 
a fallacy is likely to appear is relatively static, whereas the manner in which it undermines the argument depends 
upon the context in which the fallacy occurs. 
Fallacy Definitions: For brevity we omit the definitions of the fallacies from this paper, but Figure 2 provides a 
sample definition, and interested readers may consult our documentation of the taxonomy (ref. 12). In defining the 
fallacies we followed the format used in each of the taxonomies we surveyed. Each entry in the taxonomy consists 
of a short name of the fallacy, a definition, safety-related examples of the fallacy, and an exposition of the examples. 
The examples are intended to demonstrate real-world instances of the fallacies, and in many cases they have been 
adapted from actual safety arguments. 
Completeness & Extensibility: Despite our survey of real-world safety arguments, some of the fallacies we excluded 
from the taxonomy might appear with sufficient frequency to warrant inclusion, and there might exist fallacies that 
neither we nor the taxonomies we surveyed considered. To reduce this risk, we surveyed five different fallacy 
taxonomies in order to include a broad range of fallacies in our analysis, and the strong degree of overlap between 
the taxonomies we surveyed indicates that there is general agreement in the philosophical community as to which 
fallacies typically appear in arguments. Nevertheless, we designed the taxonomy so that it would be extensible. New 
fallacies may be added to each category, and new categories may also be added provided they respect the existing 
orthogonal topology. In addition, specific forms of the fallacies defined in the taxonomy, such as those that are 
relevant to a particular safety domain, may be added as child elements of those fallacies. 
Overlap: Overlap between fallacies refers to scenarios in which an inference exhibits multiple fallacies. It can arise 
either when multiple aspects of an inference are fallacious or when the fallacies’ definitions are not mutually 
exclusive. In the latter sense, overlapping fallacies are problematic if the strategies for removing them are 
incompatible. In Damer’s classification, for example, an overlap between a relevance fallacy and a sufficiency 
fallacy would lead to the dilemma of either removing an inference because it was irrelevant or adding additional 
support to the argument in order to make it sufficient. Since the categories of our taxonomy are largely orthogonal, 
overlap in this sense is unlikely to occur between fallacies in different categories, and fallacies that belong to the 
same category share similar repair strategies. Moreover, we consolidated fallacies whose definitions contained only 
subtle differences in order to reduce the likelihood of overlap in our taxonomy. 
Applications 
The major applications of our taxonomy are to safety-case development, pre-acceptance review, and failure analysis. 
System developers rely upon knowledge gained from previous development efforts and observed system failures in 
choosing the development practices and evidence that are necessary to ensure the safety of the systems they build. 
Likewise, regulatory agencies rely upon industrial experience and recommendations from accident investigation 
boards in specifying safety standards. Thus, as systems are deployed with unknown faults and failures are observed, 
lessons are learned from those failures that are then incorporated into future development projects. The safety case 
can facilitate this process because it contains the rationale for concluding that a system was safe to operate prior to 
Arguing from Ignorance 
An argument supports a claim by citing a lack of evidence that the claim is false. The argument does not exhibit 
the fallacy if it cites as evidence a sufficiently-exhaustive search for counter-evidence that has turned up none. 
Example: “All of the credible hazards have been identified. Aside from the hazards noted earlier, no evidence 
exists that any other hazards pose a threat to the safe operation of the system.” 
This argument attempts to prove a negative (that there are no additional credible hazards to system operation) by 
noting a lack of evidence contradicting the negative. It does not cite any efforts that have been made to discover 
such evidence. A mere lack of evidence that a claim is false does not make it true. 
Figure 2 - Sample taxonomy entry 
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an observed failure. If the failure was systemic, then the safety case is flawed and should be repaired. We refer to 
this process as the enhanced safety-case lifecycle, and we have developed a process for applying the fallacy 
taxonomy to a safety case in light of an observed failure in order to discover the fallacies in the safety argument that 
might have contributed to the failure (ref. 13). New fallacies may be added to the taxonomy as they are discovered, 
and so in addition to its applications as a preventative tool, the taxonomy is also a means by which lessons may be 
disseminated from failure analyses to those who develop and certify safety-related systems. 
Conclusions & Future Work 
As informal arguments, safety cases are prone to several forms of fallacious reasoning. Fallacies in a system’s safety 
argument could undermine the system’s safety claims, which in turn could contribute to a safety-related failure of 
the system. Avoiding these fallacies during system development and detecting them during review is essential if 
failures are to be prevented. Our assessment of three commercial safety cases revealed that they exhibited a wide 
variety of informal fallacies. Based on our observations, we surveyed five existing taxonomies of fallacies in general 
arguments to produce a new taxonomy of fallacies specific to system safety arguments. Our taxonomy is targeted at 
safety professionals who may lack formal training in logic and argumentation, and it is organized so that these 
individuals may apply it to an argument without complete knowledge of the taxonomy and without knowing a priori 
whether the argument is fallacious. Although the taxonomy is not exhaustive, it is extensible so that new fallacies 
may be added to it as they are discovered in safety arguments. 
We plan to conduct a series of controlled trials involving students and professional engineers to evaluate the extent 
to which the taxonomy improves a reviewer’s accuracy in detecting fallacious safety arguments. The trials will 
consist of asking subjects to review a set of safety arguments that have been randomly introduced and to mark which 
arguments they determine to be fallacious. The subjects’ responses will be scored, and the results from the control 
group will be compared to those of the experimental group to measure the benefit afforded by the taxonomy. 
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